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but presently *a* is perceived to be attached to *b*, a wheelbarrow, whereupon 'lady' is corrected into 'workman.'] Consciously realized *negative relations* being thus proved necessary to the complete determination of certain thought-sequences, Dr. S. tries to show that *positive relations* must also be felt between the elements *a*, *b*, and *c* of the mental sequence in the other examples, relations such that, if they were changed, the same sequences would not result. That the relations cannot be clearly represented by themselves in abstraction from their terms is no ground for denying their existence before the mind, for such an argument would also lead us to deny the existence of emotional feelings, which notoriously cannot be reproduced in abstraction from objects. The causes of association work subconsciously, calling up and expelling ideas ; but the ideas called up and expelled are not insulated mental atoms, for as we become conscious of them we become also conscious of their relations *inter se*, and to different felt relations different associative processes belong. This is what our author means by calling consciousness of relations a 'constituent element' of our thought. — For remarks on 'apperception' and 'judgment' see the work itself. It is shrewd and sound, but too pedantic. There are some theories not worth dislodging by a siege *en règle* with its length and all its apparatus ; and the theory that we have no consciousness of relations is surely one of them.

WILLIAM JAMES.

Grundriss einer einheitlichen Trieblehre vom Standpunkte des Determinismus. Von JULIUS DUBOC. Leipzig, 1892. Otto Wigand. — pp. xiv, 308.

A work that boldly takes as its motto the maxim "Thue was du willst," would seem to offer a solution of various troublesome problems, upon which, however, the present endeaemonistic "Impulse-Theory" cannot be said to throw much new light. The main body of the book is divided into four parts. In the first of these, on Conscience, the writer states the deterministic thesis that all action is the result of impulse, and defines conscience as the impulse to preserve the logical unity of the individual nature. Disobedience to conscience means self-contradiction, logical suicide. Part Second treats, with much repetition and digression, of the relation of impulse to pleasure. Every impulse when gratified results in pleasure; when inhibited, in pain. When conscience is resisted, the resulting pain is that of self-annihilation, which it is human nature to avoid at any cost. In Part Third the *summum bonum* is discussed, and defined as that which all humanity desires. But the whole race can agree in desiring only what is in accordance with the supreme law of its nature; hence obedience to conscience, the most universal impulse, is necessary to the attainment of the highest good.

The last section of the book is entitled Man and Humanity. The moral progress of mankind, according to the writer, consists in increasing recogni-

tion of the unity of the human race. The individual's primitive consciousness is of himself as a force. At this stage he acknowledges no law of his nature save the right of the stronger. With advancing culture he becomes aware of his humanity, and recognizes as the condition of that humanity the law of justice and benevolence. Conscience having been defined as the impulse to follow the law of one's nature, evidently the point where that law becomes transformed from the law of force to the law of justice and benevolence, is a crucial point for the theory. The two factors which the writer mentions as influential in doing away with the rules of force, namely, religious consciousness and sensuous culture (*Empfindungsleben*) seem hardly adequate without the aid of the utilitarian idea of welfare which Dr. Duboc expressly rejects. His chief objection to utilitarianism is that it substitutes the idea of welfare for that of pleasure. "Inasmuch," he says, "as utilitarianism requires the exercise of justice and benevolence, not for their own sakes, that is, for the pleasure attached to their exercise, but from the motive of self-interests, it sanctions that which has nothing to do with true morality." This is not quite fair to the utilitarian, who may acknowledge that pleasure is the motive power, and action is the result of the strongest motive, but who declares the strongest motive to be attached to the idea of welfare, while the present writer declares it to be attached to the idea of preserving the fundamental law of human nature, the law of justice and benevolence. The former goes a step further back in his explanation, but the theories are not mutually exclusive.

MARGARET WASHBURN.

Leibniz als Jurist und Rechtsphilosoph. VON DR. GUSTAV HARTMANN, ordentlichem Professor der Rechte in Tübingen. Tübingen, 1892. Laupp'sche Buchhandlung. — pp. 121.

This book is dedicated to Rudolph von Iherring on the occasion of his *Doctorjubiläum*. It is a fresh study from the original sources of Leibniz's treatment of the most important questions of Ethics and Jurisprudence. The first part of the work gives a somewhat full analysis of several of the philosopher's earlier treatises on legal questions. *De casibus perplexis in jure*, *De nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae*, and others. It also gives an account of his legislative projects, and without going into too great detail, brings clearly before the reader the versatility of the man and the development of his method.

The most interesting portions of the book from a philosophical point of view, are the VI and VII sections, which deal respectively with *Die Prinzipien des Rechts bei Leibniz*, and *Einfluss der Leibnizschen Jurisprudenz auf seine Philosophie*. In the first of these divisions (pp. 64-105), Professor Hartmann seeks to determine, from the various utterances of Leibniz in his many papers and letters, what must have been his real doctrine in regard to the fundamental questions of Morality and Law. Much